J-10C, and PAF Modernization in context of Indian Military Doctrinal Evolution
Pakistan has acquired J-10C multirole, 4.5 generation fighter aircraft, from China, as part of its ongoing modernization. Many experts believe that this induction by PAF is to counter the Indian acquisition of the French Rafale fighter and then some analysts, mainly Indians, think that the induction of J-10C means that Pakistan’s previously continue multirole project JF-17 Thunder couldn’t deliver on the promise even in its 3rd block.
Every acquisition must be analyzed in the context of the prevailing geo-strategic environment. J-10C are first induction in four decades which has been made to increase the operational envelope of PAF both horizontally and vertically. It’s meant to increase numbers of active fighter squadrons with modern machines but more importantly, it is meant to enhance PAF’s operational envelop by providing it with options to carry our fast, immediate, and lethal strike operations in a volatile regional situation and in an era where non-contact warfare is becoming a norm.
But the induction of J-10C is only one aspect of PAF’s modernization drive (going on since 2017) and recently PAF has confirmed that it’s expanding its operational envelope beyond the fighter jets. Space, Cyber, and EW have emerged as new spheres that PAF has ventured into. Apart from it, many MALE UAVs/UCAVs are also being inducted along with long-range air defense systems. This modernization is unprecedented. Never before PAF went through such a massive modernization.
The major driver for this massive modernization drive is the asymmetric challenge posed by arch-rival India and its doctrinal development since 2004. To better understand the induction of J-10 and PAF’s other modernization programs in the context of Indian doctrinal development it would be prudent to analyze how Indian military doctrine has evolved over the years, its key features, and the challenges it poses to Pakistan’s national security.
BACKGROUND
It has been 51 years since the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war that ended with the creation of a new country; Bangladesh. Since then, India on numerous occasions has introduced instability in the prevailing stability-instability paradigm of the subcontinent. On the other hand, Pakistan has always strived to restore stability. Indian actions in this regard can be described as her desperate attempts to create a decisive asymmetry in the balance of power between India and Pakistan allowing Delhi to coerce Islamabad on regional and global affairs due to this decisive asymmetry in the military domain. Below is a brief snapshot of Indian attempts to create instability in the region;
Year | Indian Actions | Pakistani Response |
1973 | India destabilized the region by detonating its nuclear device in May 1973 just 2 years after the 1971 war with Pakistan. | Still recovering from the shockwaves of the 1971 war, Pakistan’s security was threatened. The country was left with no option but to initiate its nuclear program to overcome this challenge. Pakistan eventually gain nuclear weapon capability in 1984. Validated device designs through cold tests. |
1983 | India initiated her Integrated Ballistic Missile Program (IBMP). The aim was to develop ballistic missiles as a mechanism of delivery of nuclear weapons. | As Pakistan was closing strategic power asymmetry against India, a new challenge forced Islamabad to respond. Pakistan’s response manifested in 1989 with the test-fire of Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 missiles. |
1986 | Operation Brasstacks. Military buildup on border behind the facade of a military exercise. It was the largest Indian military mobilization along the Pakistani border since 1971. Sunder Ji Doctrine was introduced as an Indian military guiding framework. | Pakistan responded in a tit-for-tat manner on the ground while on the diplomatic front, President Zia through his cricket diplomacy forewarned the Indian establishment about the consequences of any Indian misadventure with a possibility of nuclear weapons in the play. (This was the first time Pakistan acknowledged the existence of its nuclear program on a diplomatic level). |
1998 | India went Overt with nuclear with 5 tests in the Pokhran range. These tests were followed by a very aggressive Indian public and diplomatic discourse towards Pakistan. | Pakistan responded with 6 nuclear tests on 28 May 1998 and 30th May 1998. Indian hyper-nationalistic zeal withered away suddenly in both public and diplomatic discourse. |
2001 | India accused Pakistan of attack on her Parliament and launched a major military mobilization exercise on the international border called Operation Parakaram. | Pakistan through its superior intelligence got information about ensuing Indian military mobilization in advance and counter with the deployment of its own forces. A 10-month long standoff ended with India losing 400 troops without firing a bullet. |
2004 | India introduced Pro-Active War Strategy / Cold Start Doctrine: India began seeking limited war under a nuclear overhang. This idea of limited war with Pakistan met with stiff resistance both at home and abroad. | Pakistan introduced the “New Concept of War Fighting” (NCWF) backed with policies of Full Spectrum deterrence (for Nuclear forces) and Minimum Credible Deference (for Conventional forces). |
2006 | India revitalized 2 front war concept. Began construction of border infrastructure along with Chinese border. Indian political and military leadership began new series of provocative statements. | China and Pakistan began joint exercises. China began to expand its own military infrastructure in response. This Indian behavior led to clashes between Indian and Chinese troops of LAC and the humiliation of the Indian army. |
2017-2018 | India introduced Joint Doctrine for Indian Armed Forces (JDIAF 2017) & Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD 2018) to create more space under a nuclear overhang. Basic idea is to dilute the beginning of the conflict with isolated actions and then wait for Pakistani response before climbing up the escalation ladder. The presence of these documents DOES NOT mean India has stopped preparing for the limited war envisioned in the 2004 document, so in that sense, these documents can also be considered as part of the Proactive Strategy against Pakistan. | Pakistan announced military modernization across 3 armed forces along with adopting the more aggressive foreign policy. |
2019 | India carried out a surgical aerial strike during the dark of the night Balakot Strike. | Pakistan Surprised India in broad daylight, the rest is history. But even then Indian rhetoric against Pakistan continued, and she went ahead with indulging Pakistan in an arms race. |
2020 Onwards | India became 3rd largest spender on the military. Introduced Rafale/Meteor and other advanced capabilities. This time India is eyeing to create a decisive imbalance of power in the region against Pakistan to coerce her militarily. | Pakistan is pursuing self-reliance and a smart induction program for high-tech systems from friendly countries. |
The above table leaves very little doubt that India is still pursuing her decades-old dream of undoing Pakistan. The latest Indian attempt to create an imbalance in the region by spending on defense in out of proportion manner and eventually luring Pakistan into an expensive or unsustainable arms race amid increasing own capabilities is a tricky Indian ploy and requires an in-depth analysis so that we can see why Pakistan had to choose J-10C to counter Indian acquisitions for IAF.
Current Indian Military Posture: Analysis
India has been modernizing its forces for joint operations since 2004 under Proactive Strategy (PAS), and now the first Integrated Battle Group or IBG has been raised; though field tests are still pending (delayed due to COVID situation in India). The first IBG will be operationalized by the end of this year as per Indian media sources. These IBGs will be supported by Indian Air Force. In this support role, IAF will be carrying out stand-off strikes against the stronghold of Pakistani defenses in areas closer to the International border. Apart from IAF, Indian army artillery will be playing a key role as a support force. The target of these IBGs would be to decimate Pakistan’s border defenses without giving time for mobilization of main defensive forces from cantonments, then to penetrate Pakistani territory along the border (ideally 30-50 Km), and finally pave the way for final invasion by main Indian strike corps. Indian Army at present has 4 strike corps and all stationed against the Pakistan border.
For this rapid action, the size of each IBG would be very small (3500~5000 troops) backed by aerial and artillery firepower. This strategy operationally binds Indian Air Force with the Indian Army and Navy. This tells us in no unequivocal terms that Indian military doctrines of 2017 and 2018 are not replacements of Cold Start, but further refined, and evolved versions of it. The role of IAF has increased as India wants to operationalize the concept of IBGs.
Many Pakistani defense experts believe that with the current strength of IAF in terms of squadron strength, it’s in no position to carry out a sustained air campaign against Pakistan if the conflict prolongs. And Indian army also has similar shortcomings like a shortage of young officers. This assessment is not completely wrong but the Indian state and military establishment has made their intentions clear through multiple military doctrine documents and is determined to achieve operational synergy under the JDIAF 2017 to activate PAS.
In the short run, the Indian military is experimenting to dilute the PAS further to avoid any large-scale conflict as it continues to hone its PAS capabilities.
If we analyze Indian actions like the Balakot strike in 2019, it is evident that India is looking to find a strategy where she can keep the conflict level well below even a conventional war level. India refuse to climb on the escalation ladder after Pakistan’s retaliatory strike against 4 military targets on 27th Feb 2019 and launch a relentless information war to convert IAF’s failure into success.
This is again based on the very dangerous assumption that either Pakistani leadership doesn’t have the political will to respond to a small scale, isolated incident initiated by India or Pakistan’s military capabilities are not strong enough to deter India from such actions without escalating the conflict which then is treated as a Pakistani invasion or provocation with the help of media ops/ diplomatic offenses.
Balakot Strike was made with a similar faith but Pakistani reaction at both political and military levels took India and the entire world by surprise. Pakistan responded to a nighttime strike with a declared daytime counter-strike. But, Balakot was not the last episode of Indian pursuance of her long-term strategic objective of establishing itself as the regional power through coercive military diplomacy against Pakistan.
Instead of taking some remedial measures to ease regional tension, India continued to pursue this dangerous game of Brinksmanship with Pakistan. The latest addition to the list of such actions was the “accidental launch” of a Brahmos cruise missile while earlier in the month an Indian Kalveri class submarine was tracked by Pakistan Navy. Indian military constantly issues threats to Pakistan.
IAF is going to play a bigger role in Indian military strategy. Both Balakot Strike and “accidental launch” of Brahmos missile into Pakistan on 9th March 2022 were carried out by IAF. The Indian air force has also enhanced its strategic and tactical lift capabilities considerably through the induction of C-17 Globemaster III and C-130Js cargo planes. Indian military maintains Special Forces behind the enemy lines. Such force multipliers play a key role in any conflict and are difficult to hit unless the opposing air force has very long-range air-to-air kill capabilities.
To support its military operations, the Indian air force has established many high power, long-range surveillance radar complexes across international borders monitoring Pakistani air space as well. These radars centers work as the nerve center of overall India’s air defense systems as they serve as Command and Control (C2) nodes.
According to the Indian media reports, IBGs will be stationed across the Pakistani border in the following locations.
- IBG‟s-1 are to be stationed in Jammu, the area which holds importance concerning Indo-Pak relations. IBG‟s-2 are to be stationed in Sikh holiest city of Amritsar, with a target to attack Lahore, the cultural capital of Pakistan and administrative capital of Punjab.
- IBG‟s-3 are likely to be placed in Chandigarh, to penetrate Kasur and its adjacent areas
- IBG‟s-4 is to be placed in Suratgarh to attack and make shallow penetration into Bahawalpur
- IBG‟s-5 might be stationed in Bikaner, to attack Rahimyar and its adjacent areas
- IBG‟s-6 are to be stationed near Jalmur for attacking and penetration into Sindh
- IBG‟s-7 are to be deployed in Bremer, to target Mirpur Khas and the areas in its proximity
- IBG‟s-8 are to be placed in Palanpur for attacking Hyderabad.
And now in 2022, India has Rafale, eventually. This French fighter jet is an advance 4 point 5 generation fighter, with strong air-to-air, air-to-ground, anti-ship, and electronic warfare capabilities. The fighter jet arrived in India with IAF specific modifications, details of which are classified. More importantly, this platform provided IAF, with the most advanced air-to-air BVR weapon in the region; MBDA, Meteor. This ramjet propulsion missile is claimed to be having largest No Escape Zone.
If we talk about the impact of this Indian PAS strategy combined with new acquisitions for the Navy and Air Force, it’s clear that any future conflict in the region is going to be the fast pace with first-round mainly consisting of the non-contact phase where both sides will try to dismantle, destroy and disrupt opposing military infrastructure as much as possible using stand-off weapons. In 2019, both sides demonstrated their respective stand-off capabilities; it’s another matter that the Indian Air Force utterly failed.
Apart from Stand-off capabilities, the Indian military has been aggressively adding various airborne assets in the form of force multipliers and utility aircraft. Below is a snapshot of which aerial platform India acquired during the last couple of decades.
Item |
Quantity |
AH-64D Long Bow Apache Gunship | 22 |
P-8I Maritime Multimission Aircraft | 12 |
C-17 Globemaster Heavy Airlifter | 11 |
C-130J Transport Aircraft | 6 |
Rafale Fighter Jet, France | 18 |
Mig-29K fighter | 45 |
LCA Tejas | 12 (83MK1A on order) |
MQ9B Predator Drones |
10 ~30 |
Apart from these platforms, the Indian government is eyeing to acquire 114 multirole fighters, and frontrunners in the competition are platforms like Rafale and F-15EX or F-18 Block III. This acquisition is going to take a long time but once manifested it is going to shake the regional balance of power once again.
Challenge:
This Indian modernization and expansion of aerial fleet across all three services pose a serious challenge for Pakistan’s national security. India has gotten access to advanced US/Western technology by pretending as a counterweight to China but in reality, all its military hardware is deployed on the Pakistan border.
Being a numerically smaller air force, PAF is against a stiff challenge once again. PAF’s smart-induction strategy, as hinted by ACM Zaheer Babar Sidhu during the J-10C contract signing in June 2021, is going to ensure that PAF will maintain a minimum credible deterrence against these Indian current and future plans.
For example, the current induction of 36 Rafale by IAF is another episode where India has tried to tilt the regional balance of power in her favor thinking PAF has no competing platform accessible. Pakistan reacted naturally! As IAF was waiting for Rafale, PAF had begun negotiations with China and an agreement was reached in June 2021 for the supply of J-10Cs to PAF. The most modern iteration of the Chinese 4.5th generation is a single-engine multirole fighter with similar capabilities that French fighter offers. Pakistan, is reported, going to get 54 to 60 of these jets in 3 squadrons.
J-10C and PAF
So, how J-10C is going to help Pakistan in mitigating the threat posed by Indian PSA and the modernization and expansion it has ushered in Indian forces?
Currently, 76 F-16s form hi-tier of hi-lo mix for PAF. On the Lo-side, JF-17 along with Mirages III/V and F-7P/PG form the mainstay of PAF and this composition is problematic on both qualitative and quantitative levels. Mirages are more than 50 years old while F-7s are 25-30 years. These are 3rd generation fighters. JF-17 Thunder is a modern fighter and is evolving over time. With Block III joining the PAF fleet will usher much-needed cutting-edge technologies like AESA, HMS/HMD, HOBS WVR Missiles, Longer range BVR AAMs. PAF is in dire need to replace legacy Mirages and F-7s. JF-17 Thunder is going to serve this purpose. But unfortunately, being a lightweight fighter by design, it can’t replace all Mirages squadrons that form the strike punch of PAF. For this replacement, PAF ideally was looking for a delta wing design. In the past, PAF did evaluate both EF-2000 Typhoon and Rafale but couldn’t acquire any due to the exuberant cost of the platform and possible political strings attached. Instead, PAF took a creative decision and opted for the ROSE project where PAF Mirages were fitted with strike elements to enhance their air to ground capabilities.
ROSE upgraded Mirages were a good solution as a stopgap measure during the early 2000s. A new strike platform was required to reinforce the deterrence after IAF introduced the Su-30MKI+Brahmos combo in 2019-2020. Though Ra’ad cruise missile is integrated on Mirage III these aircraft can’t operate in a highly dense and contested EW environment. Their limited payload capacity and noisy and less fuel-efficient turbofan engines are major shortcomings.
This is where J-10CE entered into the picture. It will complement the hi-tier F-16 fleet to share their workload and at the same time will also provide excellent mission support to JF-17 Thunders on the lo-tier. So, in the next 3 to 5 years PAF will mainly consist of F-16s, J-10CE, and JF-17 Thunder. Both J-10CE and JF-17 Thunder share many system commonalities like both have similar narrow frame wide-angle holographic head-up display (HUD).
In the air defense role, J-10CE will come with next-generation air-to-air missiles, and air-to-ground weapons. Among them are PL-10, 5th generation infrared homing, Within Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile. The missile is fitted with a multi-element Image and Infra-Red seeker, that’s capable of +/-90 degrees off-boresight angles. Furthermore, This missile seeker can be slaved to a helmet-mounted display, allowing the pilot to track and lock on a target beyond the aircraft’s radar scan envelope, using the missile’s high off-boresight capability, achieved by the pilot turning his head towards the target to lock-on, better known as “look and shoot”.
On the Beyond Visual Range side, J-10CE will carry PL-15 BVR Air-To-Air missile, equipped with a dual pulse rocket motor, Active electronically Scanned Array seeker, and 2-way data link. PL-15 is said to have an effective range of 200 Kilometers. The export version of the missile has a range of 145 Kilometers though. It’s not clear so far which version Pakistan Air Force will get. There is a consensus among military experts in the country that there is no point in getting J-10CE if Pakistan is to get only the export version of this missile. Because in that case, it will not able to deter the threat posed by the IAF Meteor missile that has a range over 160 Kilometers.
Though PAF hasn’t announced the weapon’s package of its J-10Cs except for WVR (PL-10E) and BVR (PL-15E) AAM, it is likely to get YJ-91 anti-ship missile as the primary strike weapon. It is going to play a key role in enhancing PAF’s stand-off capabilities against Indian military infrastructure, especially against hardened command and control centers. It has a range of 5-150Km and carries a 165 Kg warhead. The missile is capable of achieving Mach 3.5 speed making it very difficult to be intercepted. A unique feature of this ramjet-powered missile is its dual use as an anti-ship and anti-radiation missile making it the perfect weapon for SEAD/DEAD as well. In the pure anti-ship role, it follows a low-low profile and can dive down to a 7m sea-skimming flight path making it v difficult to intercept. Apart from YJ-91, J-10Cs are also capable of carrying longer-range anti-ship cruise missile C-802AK with a reported range of 180 Km. The missile can travel at Mach 0.9 and is equipped with a multiband seeker and 165 or 190 kg warhead depending on requirements. PAF has already integrated this missile into its JF-17 Thunder aircraft.
For CAS missions, it is expected to carry 2 KD-88/88A AGMs, or 2 JG-500 LGBs, or 2 new JG-500B 500kg LGBs.
On the avionics side, J-10CE is equipped with state of an art EW suite. S-740 Missile Approach Warning Sensors (MAWS) is part of IR protection while its IRST enables it to perform passively in dense EW environments. Dedicated laser designation targeting pod and Self Protection Jamming pods (K/JDC01A and K/RKL700A respectively) are carried on dedicated hardpoints. The aircraft is also equipped modern ARW9101A Radar Warning Receiver (RWR). So far, the Pakistani J-10C doesn’t carry a datalink antenna on top of the fuselage and the reason is obvious. PAC will install Link-17 capable DL antennas on J-10C to practically integrate these fighters into PAF’s operational communication network. Like all modern fighters, the flight control system of J-10C is fully computerized and runs on a Type 634 digital quadruplex Fly by Wire (FBW) system.
J-10CE is equipped with WS-10B turbofan which is capable of producing 31,000 lbs maximum. It’s a third-generation turbofan engine which is very reliable. WS-10 has 7 variants equipping 5 different types of aircraft in PLAAF. The engine is equipped with a Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) system enabling full digital control of all aspects of engine control.
It has been reported by Pakistani media earlier this month that Pakistan Air Force is going to equip 3 Squadrons of J-10CE. Currently, Pakistan Air Force is going to re-equip No 15 Squadron stationed at Rafiqui Base in Shorkot, Jhang district of Punjab. This squadron is part of the 33rd Tactical Attack Wing, under the Central Command of PAF.
A distinct advantage J-10CE brings to the table is its options to be scaled and upgraded very rapidly unlike IAF Rafale where an upgrade will cost a lot more and India will have to sign a new deal for that just like they had to for their Mirage-2000Is. Similarly, J-10CE’s weapon package will continue to grow as PLAAF will keep getting new weapons for every role. It will increase PAF’s weapons options and operational flexibility manifold.
PAF Modernization beyond J-10CE
J-10CE is not the only system PAF is acquiring to keep Indian doctrinal designs in check. As J-10CE was the first major induction into PAF’s fleet since 1982 (qualitatively speaking), no fighter alone can win a war without support elements within the air force and other forces. To that end, PAF has embarked on a comprehensive modernization plan.
PAF has released a new video about its modernization without any narration. Though it’s a video song that showcases some very interesting updates about PAF’s modernization. According to the video, PAF is going to (or already has) acquired YLC-8 UHF band long-range anti-stealth radar.
Apart from it, PAF is going to raise a fleet of multiple Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) like Turkish Akinci, and TB2 along with local Shahpar-II.
PAF has already acquired YLC-18 long-range anti-stealth radar with a reported range of 500 kilometers.
The real upgrade according to the video is the establishment of the national ISR center, PAF cyber command, PAF space command, and updates about the design of PAF’s next-gen fighter program. Details of these are classified for opsec reaction. So we will wait for PAF to issue more details about these projects.
On the ADS side, it looks like PAF is going to acquire S-300B with a reported range of 250-300 kilometers against a fighter plan size threat. S-300B interceptor missile reportedly carries passive infrared seeker making its jamming very difficult and protecting the system against anti-radiation missiles. This is going to be a key acquisition as Pakistan Army air defense has already inducted an S-300P system with a 125-kilometer range. J-10CE and S-300B combo will provide essential deterrence against Indian aerial threats.
Summary
Indian military doctrinal evolution is an interesting case study for military warfare students. India changed her defense posture from completely defensive to proactive defense. Now India is planning to adopt more assertive military strategies with a major goal to coerce Pakistan through military diplomacy. Pakistan on the other hand has always played the role of harbinger of stability in the regional stability-instability paradigm. The latest Indian strategy is to lure Pakistan into an expensive arms race through the procurement of high-tech weapon systems like Rafale fighter and S-400 ADS.
Pakistan has responded through a smart induction strategy where Pakistan is inducting systems in its armed forces that not only counter Indian acquisitions effectively without getting too expensive economically. J-10C is a step in the same direction and with its speed, payload capacity, EW suite, and avionics it will be a key deterrence against Indian advances under PAS towards Pakistan. It will complement the existing F-16 fleet and will replace the Mirage fleet gradually along with JF-17 Block III. J-10C will be the last 4.5 induction into PAF before PAF chooses to induct a next-generation fighter and it will keep guarding Pakistani skies for foreseeable future along with F-16s and JF-17s.
Pakistan Air Force is committed to retaining first shot first kill capability against IAF, there are several projects in various stages of completion and by the time PAF will prove its dominance over Pakistani skies. InshaAllah.
Shahzad Masood Roomi is founding member and, editor security and geopolitics at GCW. He is IT graduate and has more than 10 years experience of being a geopolitics and defense affairs analyst. He focuses on IR, geopolitics, strategic studies, maritime security, cybersecurity issues, military aviation, history and geography. His work has published in national and international media outlets.
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